Introduction
In the last decades, international refugee law (IRL) and international human rights law (IHRL) have increasingly taken into account sexual minorities' needs. Despite not being one of the grounds of persecution under the 1951 Geneva Convention on the Status of Refugees (Refugees Convention), 1 sexual orientation 2 has been identified as a relevant factor for the recognition of refugee status, at least, since 1993. 3 In the intervening period, people persecuted for a sexual minority identity have been able to find protection under IRL due to the evolving interpretation of the Refugees Convention's five grounds, in particular that of 'membership of a particular social group' (PSG). 4 In turn, IHRL has evolved to a point where sexual minorities are more fully included within the scope of rights and freedoms set forth in universal and regional human rights treaties, in particular via the prohibition of discrimination. This evolution gave rise to a sort of 'humanisation' of lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender (LGBT) people, 5 resulting in recognition of the need to specifically address their socially disadvantageous position.
Yet, strange as it may seem, this simultaneous development has not always led to a mutual or fruitful intersection between IRL and IHRL when people fleeing homophobia are involved. 6 This is particularly evident, as this article shows, when this intersection is tested at the interpretation level. In fact, despite what the rules on the interpretation of treaties require, 7 IHRL has played a limited role in defining key terms of the Refugees Convention so far. In light of the potentially beneficial effect for all people claiming asylum, this article explores from two different angles what role IHRL may play in enhancing the protection provided by IRL to people fleeing homophobia. It argues that IHRL may, firstly, complement IRL in facilitating their access to asylum determination procedures in those States that are bound by the Refugee Convention and human rights treaties. Secondly, IHRL may expand the notion of persecution used in IRL when sexual orientation is the ground of one's well-founded fear of persecution, at least more comprehensively than it currently does in practice. In this attempt, this contribution goes beyond previous analyses because it relies not only on research on the European human rights and asylum legal framework 8 and on asylum based on sexual orientation and gender 5 Paul Johnson, Homosexuality and the European Convention on Human Rights (Routledge 2014). 6 Although this article takes the example of persecution based on sexual orientation, many of the issues raised would be equally true for other sexual minorities, such as people fleeing transphobia given the similar experiences they have to face in terms of intense social and legal discrimination. See Laurie Berg and Jenni Millbank 'Developing a Jurisprudence of Transgender Particular Social Group' [2013] UTS: Law Research Paper No. 1. 7 Convention on the Law of the Treaties, opened to signature in Vienna on 1969 and entered into force in 1980, Article 31, para 1 and 3, c). 8 These will be referenced where appropriate. For a specific study on the EU framework on SOGI asylum, see Nuno Ferreira 'Reforming the Common European Asylum System: Enough Rainbow for Queer Asylum Seekers?' [2018] (2) GenIUS 25-42. identity (SOGI) grounds, 9 but also on qualitative data collected in the context of the ERCfunded SOGICA project in Italy. 10 The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 briefly examines the evolution of IRL and IHRL in protecting sexual minorities, pointing out the cross-fertilisation between these different branches of international law while highlighting the potential scope for further intersection. Section 3 builds a case for a complementary role of IHLR in protecting against persecution based on sexual orientation, showing how the obligation to implement the Refugees Convention may, in turn, raise obligations under IHRL. In doing so, a model of jurisdiction based on impact is explored. Section 4 investigates to what extent a more fruitful intersection between these two areas of international law is possible in terms of interpretation. By taking into account the Vienna Convention on the Law of the Treaties (VCLT), it focuses on the definition of persecution as a remarkable example of the still uncrossed border between IRL and IHRL. The qualitative data underpinning this study relates to people seeking protection in Europe, therefore both sections drawn on recent interpretations of international and regional human rights treaties and on developments within the European Union (EU). The EU has in fact given birth to a unique asylum system that is a remarkable example of intersection between IRL and IHRL, whereby the 9 Among others, Jenni Millbank 'The Role of Rights in Asylum Claims based on Sexual Orientation' [2004] HRLR193-228; James Hathaway, James Pobjoy 'Queer Cases Make Bad Law' [2012] ILP; Jenni Millbank 'The Right of Lesbians and Gay Men to Live Freely, Openly and on Equal Terms is Not Bad Law: A Reply to Hathaway and Pobjoy' [2012] NYUJILP 497-515; Marco Balboni La protezione internazionale in ragione del genere, dell'orientamento sessuale e dell'identità di genere (Giappichelli 2012); Thomas Spijkerboer (ed), Fleeing Homophobia: Sexual Orientation, Gender Identity and Asylum (Routledge 2013); France Houle, Karine Mac Allister 'Quand le droit international des droits de l'Homme et le droit canadien des réfugiés LGBTQ+ convergent' [2017] CJWL 317-342. 10 The SOGICA project includes fieldwork research, with interviews, focus groups and observations in court, in UK, Germany and Italy. The fieldwork research has been approved by the Social Sciences & Arts Cross-Schools Research Ethics Committee (C-REC) ethical review process at the University of Sussex (Approval no. ER/NH285/1). The evidence used in this article refers to the outcomes of 40 interviews carried out with a variety of actors (people claiming asylum, decision-makers, professionals and volunteers working with and/or supporting SOGI claimants) in Italy, in 2017 and 2018. See <www.sogica.org> for more info (accessed 7 August 2019).
Article for the Special Issue on "Gendered Borders" to be published in Netherlands Quarterly of Human Rights, 3/2019 4 Refugees Convention as the cornerstone of Common European Asylum System (CEAS) 11 is combined with the need to respect the EU's (international and internal) human rights obligations. Some final remarks are made in Section 5.
Proof of intersections between IRL and IHRL in asylum claims based on sexual orientation
In both IHRL and IRL, a clear trend has progressively emerged for addressing sexual minorities' protection claims that was absent at the time of their genesis. All relevant instruments, including respectively the Refugees Convention and human rights treaties, have been given an evolving reading to reflect the social development of today's international community, both in terms of forms of persecution and of prohibited discrimination in the enjoyment of the full catalogue of human rights and freedoms. 12 If we look first at IRL, the persecution of people fleeing homophobia gained international attention due to the process of 'gendering' the Refugees Convention. 13 The peak of this process was the adoption by the UNHCR of specific SOGI Guidelines, 14 which significantly draw on IHRL. In particular, the Guidelines made clear that SOGI claims are not based only on "exogenous" harms but, more often than not, originate from what can be called an 'intimate modification' of oneself imposed by the society in which the individual lives. This is not equal to (only) a modification of behaviour in, or the impact of this modification on, people fleeing homophobia. 15 innate or an immutable characteristic protected as such under IHRL, harm may also arise from the inability to express one's identity without fear of persecution. Therefore, people cannot be required to renounce or conceal their sexual orientation in recognition of the impact this has in every dimension of life. 16 In this way, the UNHCR SOGI Guidelines crossed the border of classical harm in the refugee context to include types of relational-driven harms, ie those originating from the interaction between an inherent personal characteristic and an external environment preventing its full expression. At the same time, they stressed the variety of experiences of people claiming asylum on sexual orientation grounds, which may be influenced by cultural, economic, family, political, religious and social factors. Although this interaction may vary across countries and people in light of the different factors at play, the need for international protection may nonetheless arise. Additionally, the nature of this interaction does not prevent an asylum claim arising even when the inherent characteristic is not possessed. In fact, in line with the general interpretation of the notion of refugee, it is sufficient that one's belonging to a sexual minorityeg being gayis assumed by the surrounding society ("attribution"), thus generating the risk of related persecution. 17 As with the gender dimension, this may be the case when the person has simply refused to adhere to 'socially or culturally defined roles or expectations of behaviour attributed to his or her sex', 18 thus engendering the suspicion of being nonheterosexual. This occurs even more frequently, according to cases reported by decisionmakers in Italy when men have sex with other men for economic reasons or needs. 19 For the purposes of application of the Refugees Convention, it is immaterial whether these 16 The CJEU shared also this view in Joined cases C 199/12 to C 201/12, Article for the Special Issue on "Gendered Borders" to be published in Netherlands Quarterly of Human Rights, 3/2019 6 men are gay, what matters is whether they have a well-founded fear of persecution because are perceived as such by the surrounding society.
Following previous attempts by the UNHCR 20 based on a reading of IRL in light of IHRL, the Guidelines also clarify that persecution has a case-specific dimension consisting of "serious" human rights violations or "the cumulative effects" of a number of these violations. 21 Most importantly, they stress that this seriousness refers to the harm perpetrated upon, or feared by, the claimant and if this harm had or might have a degrading and humiliating effect, irrespective of being "physically, psychologically or socially" produced. This definition seems to support a powerful conclusion: when sexual orientation is involved, the threshold of severity can also be reached when the treatment of the person at stake amounts to a denial of this intimate characteristic, including selfdenial or feelings of shame leading to the inability to be open about one's sexual orientation. 22 Yet, as we will show below, seven years after the adoption of said Guidelines these human rights violations are still not univocally identified as persecution.
If we move to IHRL, thanks to an increasing international consensus, 23 a constant trend has emerged calling for an inclusive interpretation of the full catalogue of human rights, alone and in combination with non-discrimination provisions where these provisions complement other substantive rights and freedoms (eg Art. 2 ICCPR; Art. 14 ECHR).
Without analysing here the peculiarities of this process, it is noticeable that such an evolution emerges in the activities of all international human rights treaty-based bodies, as well as in universal fora such as the UN General Council. 24 A transversal trend also informs all regional organisationsthe Organisation for American States (OAS), 25 the African Union (AU), 26 the Council of Europe (CoE) 27 leading, at least to a certain extent, regional human rights bodies to include the SOGI dimension in the interpretation of regional charters and conventions.
Taken comprehensively, these developments have reinforced the understanding of sexual orientation as a core human rights issue. Furthermore, international and regional human rights bodies have progressively affirmed the idea that contracting States may be asked to undertake positive actions to address sexual minorities' specific needs. Similarly, blanket restrictions on the enjoyment of human rights based solely on SOGI have been found to amount to serious interferences, if not denials, of one's most intimate aspect. 28 Perhaps even more interestingly, the same human rights bodies have also drawn attention to the nexus between the lack of enjoyment of human rights and the consequence for the individual expression of sexual orientation in terms of one's ability to freely make life choices. As a result, the long-standing distinction between prohibited treatment and permissible restrictions under IHRL is increasingly put to the test. For instance, it becomes extremely difficult nowadays to justify restrictions on the enjoyment of the right to respect for family life, being this right also a way to express one's sexual orientation deserving protection under IHRL 29 (and, as argued below, also under IRL). It is no surprise that these developments have also had positive implications for the treatment of claimants who request asylum in reasons of sexual orientation at arrival. If we focus on Europe, the most powerful instance of this (new) approach to people fleeing homophobia 24 This overall evolution is extremely relevant for arguing that IHRL may still play an additional role in the protection of people fleeing homophobia in intersection with IRL, if we focus the attention on the territorial and normative borders that these claimants encounter in their search of a 'safe place', as the next sections show.
Beyond (territorial) borders: facilitating access to asylum through human rights law
Despite its primary aim being to protect people fleeing persecution on the five grounds provided by the Refugees Convention, it does not require that contracting States facilitate access to their national asylum determination systems. The same requirement, if aimed at preventing human rights violations, is still being debated under IHLR. To the contrary, at least in Europe, we instead see increased efforts to prevent such access. As Violeta
Moreno-Lax has effectively demonstrated in relation to the EU's and its member States' migration policies, nowadays a complex mix of border controls follow migrants, including asylum claimants, in their attempt to access Europe. Strikingly enough, 'the system as currently devised appears to imply that, while pre-entry controls can operate extraterritoriality, protection obligations arise only if potential beneficiaries present themselves at the (physical) borders of the EU'. 31 In practice, the main consequence is a high risk of exposing asylum claimants to dangerous journeys to reach European borders. This risk emerges powerfully in the personal accounts of SOGI claimants from Sub-Saharan African countries gathered through the SOGICA fieldwork. Their journeys to Europe have always exposed them to serious human rights violations, including forced stays, 32 , forced labour, sexual exploitation and robberies, 33 and rapes. 34 In the worst scenario, a claimant from Cameroon reported 'I came with my boyfriend but he didn't make it, he died in the sea', 35 but the lack of legal recognition of their relationship denies the surviving partner the ability to report his boyfriend's death appropriately and see it recorded as such. In recounting their passage to Libya, a claimant from Nigeria even stated 'It's even better that you are recognised as a gay in Nigeria than to be recognised as a gay in Libya'. 36 These violations seem to combine the well-documented general hostility towards migrants with hostility to sexual minorities. As a claimant from Despite the risk of exposing asylum claimants to these additional abuses and suffering, the existence of an obligation to grant safe access to asylum claimants by issuing humanitarian visas was dismissed within the EU by the CJEU. 39 Interestingly, although EU asylum law aims to create a sort of 'Geneva +' trying to combine the respect of IRL 32 Interview with male claimant from Nigeria (Italy, 3 January 2018). 33 Interview with male claimant from Nigeria (Italy, 30 June 2018). 34 Interview with female claimant from Nigeria (Italy, 20 April 2018). 35 Interview with male claimant from Cameroon (Italy, 17 October 2017). 36 Interview with male claimant from Nigeria (Italy, 16 December 2017). 37 Interview with male claimant from Cameroon (Italy, 17 October 2017). 38 For instance, in terms of appearance, some gay people may find difficult to behave as being straight. See Article for the Special Issue on "Gendered Borders" to be published in Netherlands Quarterly of Human Rights, 3/2019 10 with IHRL, issuing humanitarian visas cannot be derived from the current state of EU law but remains nonetheless a possibility left to EU member States' discretion. As the CJEU notes this discretion should be implemented in compliance with their international obligations, ie those derived from IRL and IHRL, beyond EU law. 40 In order to verify whether such compliance may lead to an obligation to facilitate access to national asylum determination procedures for people fleeing homophobia, we now focus our attention on the effects that the denial of humanitarian visas has on these people.
Establishing jurisdiction and 'impact'
The absence of an obligation to facilitate access to asylum under IRL is essentially connected with the scope of application of the Refugees Convention. As other international treaties, that Convention binds States within their territorial borders. Even its core protection beyond refugee status, ie the duty of non-refoulement under Article 33, which may be implied in the process of deciding the issuance a humanitarian visa, makes no exception. More precisely, although Article 33 of the Refugees Convention can be applied to all refugees/people claiming asylum against any measures leadingdirectly or indirectlyto refoulement, this provision does not make clear whether or not it has extraterritorial effect. This state of uncertainty is due also to the general scope of the Refugees Convention. In light of the notion of refugee, this Convention requires that asylum claimants, being unable or unwilling to request protection in the State of origin, should apply "before" the authorities of the receiving State (thus implying in most cases a physical presence in this State or, at least, at its borders). Following the same rule, the non-refoulement principle under the Refugees Convention seems to require the presence of the people in need of international protection in the receiving State (or at its borders) in order to apply. 41 When human rights bodied have been called to interpret IRL, they have provided a broader reading of this provision. For instance, the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights found that Article 33 of the Refugees Convention cannot have the above geographical limitation. 42 In fact, despite being primarily territorial, the application of this Convention depends on the receiving State's position with respect to the asylum claimant. It follows that this person can also be "under the control" of one of the contracting Stateseg a foreign territory over which it exercises its power by invitation or force, 43 or when they are placed under that State's authority, eg before diplomatic agents or on ships flying its flag 44in order to enjoy protection against non-refoulement. 45 Yet, even if this is true, the protection against non-refoulement under IRL would nonetheless be limited to cases of persecution for the reasons expressed in Article 33 of the Refugees Convention, ie those relevant for being identified as a refugee (race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion).
Considering the difficulty experienced by people fleeing homophobia in proving a wellfounded fear of persecution (see section 4 below), IHRL goes beyond these limitations by potentially ensuring a wider and autonomous protection. In fact, the principle of nonrefoulement in human rights treaties has been included or developed to prevent torture and, as in the case of the ECHR, inhuman and degrading treatment on any basis. 46 Consequently, it can also cover a more comprehensive range of situations that may not 42 Article for the Special Issue on "Gendered Borders" to be published in Netherlands Quarterly of Human Rights, 3/2019 12 prima facie amount to persecution per se or that are experienced during the journeys to access asylum. On this basis, IHRL may require relevant States do not expose asylum claimants, who intend to submit an asylum application and are under their jurisdiction, to forms of prohibited ill-treatment, including those motivated by one's sexual orientation.
Therefore, it can be argued that, under IHRL, States that exercise authority over asylum claimants by deciding whether or not to admit them to their territory, so as to have their asylum requests duly evaluated, are required to consider the impact that their decision has in terms of exposure to human rights violations. This argument seems to be supported in particular by the recent interpretation of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) by the Human Rights Committee (HRC). In its General comment no. 36 on Article 6 ICCPR (the right to life), the HRC makes two fundamental statements for our purposes. Firstly, it states that the right to life 'concerns the entitlement of individuals to be free from acts and omissions that are intended or may be expected to cause their unnatural or premature death, as well as to enjoy a life with dignity', focussing the attention on the 'foreseeable and preventable life-terminating harm or injury'. 47 Secondly, by looking at the observance of contracting States' obligations beyond territorial borders, it points out that the contracting State 'must also take appropriate legislative and other measures to ensure that all activities taking place in whole or in part within their territory and in other places subject to their jurisdiction, but having a direct and reasonably foreseeable impact on the right to life of individuals outside their territory, are consistent' 48 with Article 6 ICCPR. Considering the right to life as a non-derogable right 47 HRC, General Comment no. 36, 2018, para 5-7. 48 ibid [22] (emphasis added). Indeed, at para 63, the HRC clearly finds that all persons subject to its jurisdiction means 'all persons over whose enjoyment of the right to life [a State party] exercises power or effective control. This includes persons located outside any territory effectively controlled by the State, whose right to life is nonetheless impacted by its military or other activities in a direct and reasonably foreseeable manner' (emphasis added).
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Following this reasoning, any decision adopted in places subject to contracting States' jurisdiction which prevents people fleeing homophobia from accessing asylum should embed an evaluation of its 'direct and reasonably foreseeable impact' on the enjoyment of these rights outside their territory. If we take the example of a decision on the issuance of a humanitarian visa requested by a person who wishes to flee homophobia, the specific situation of this group of claimants seems to play a central role in this evaluation. Firstly, the general risks to which this group is exposed is publicly known. The levels of homophobia or transphobia of the countries of origin, as well as of those that need to be crossed to access asylum, are regularly monitored and documented, eg by relying on the existence of laws criminalising a specific sexual orientation. Considering the personal accounts reported above, in addition to the abuses occurred or might occur in their countries if they do not flee, SOGI claimants often need to cross countries, like North-African States, which cannot be assumed to be safe in light of their human rights records in this field. 49 Secondly, and perhaps mostly important, in the case of refusal of a safe passage to the destination country of asylum, this group of claimants is forced to travel with people having the same cultural and social background as their persecutors in their countries of origin. In light of the developments that have occurred within IRL and IHRL (see section 2), this means they need to continue hiding their identity to avoid additional abuse and violence, which amounts, at least, to degrading treatment. Consequently, in the case of people fleeing homophobia, there are substantial grounds for believing that the decision to deny a humanitarian visa may expose them to violations of the prohibition of torture and/or inhuman or degrading treatment and, in the worst-case scenario, of the right to life. The impact of such decisions seems indeed reasonably 'foreseeable' and 'direct', 49 SOGICA interviews (n 10).
calling States bound by IHRL to prevent these violations, if not also ensuring an effective implementation of IRL-related obligations. in light of the serious risks to which applicants could be reasonably exposed outside Lithuania's territory, its authorities were also required under Article 13 ECHR to ensure them the possibility of appeal before a domestic court with an automatic suspensive effect of the decisions refusing them entry into its territory. 53 If the specific situation of the asylum claimants was an essential element in the reading of Article 3 ECHR in M.A., when national authorities deal with requests to access asylum by people fleeing homophobia cannot certainly ignore their particular condition. Article for the Special Issue on "Gendered Borders" to be published in Netherlands Quarterly of Human Rights, 3/2019 16 access to asylum in order to prevent the additional abuses and life-threatening violence which people fleeing homophobia may be exposed to when they express their intention to submit an asylum claim before the receiving State's authorities. These may include diplomatic agents but, more generally, all those authorities whose decisions on entry may have a foreseeable and direct impact on the enjoyment of their human rights, at least nonderogable ones. Consequently, for example taking into account the ECHR, issuing humanitarian visas as a potential duty under Articles 2 and 3 ECHR cannot be excluded, which might foster in turn a similar development within EU.
Identifying obligations
Yet, to be sure, even if a duty to protect people belonging to sexual minorities wishing to claim asylum exists under IHRL, it may not be easy for claimants to secure this protection.
The enjoyment of such protection requires the expression of the reason for seeking asylum, which may be an insurmountable barrier for those who fear additional persecution in case of refusal. Others may be unaware of the possibility of securing international protection for such reasons. As one SOGICA interviewee put it, 'I do not need to tell my story to anyone', 56 in relation to strangers. Yet where people fleeing homophobia are able to promptly manifest the reasons for asking asylum, this is no guarantee that they will be recognised as refugees under IRL. They then need to convince national asylum decision makers that they fit the refugee definition and, in particular, that their fear of persecution is well-founded. This specific difficulty for people fleeing homophobia seems to relate to the role attributed to IHRL in the interpretation of IRL, which prevents a more fruitful intersection between these areas of international law as the next section explores. 56 Interview with male claimant from Gambia (Italy, 20 April 2018).
Beyond (normative) borders: interpreting persecution through a human rights lens
The analysis of the UNHCR SOGI Guidelines shows that the identification of (suffered or feared) persecution is, unquestionably, the area where IRL has benefited the most from developments occurred in IHRL. 57 Yet, neither the Refugees Convention nor these same SOGI Guidelines define the notion of persecution. 58 African […] these are things that you don't tell people. This is something you keep to yourself and you ask a question to yourself and you try to answer yourself because telling another person… I cannot'. 62 Even adopting what was thought as the "safest behaviour" to avoid being rejected by family and society, people may be nonetheless forced to escape.
As another claimant put it, 'They don't like erm… bisexual or this sexual, how to call it, this gay and lesbian issue. But since I was doing it, it is just that they never caught me off and I was never expecting it could happen but unfortunately it has happened'. 63 The randomness of events was stressed by a Nigerian claimant: 'if they find out you are a lesbian, they will put you in prison […], they started blackmailing me to bring money These experiences support the view that, when asylum claimants belonging to sexual minorities are at stake, feared persecution becomes a fundamental part of their life, well before "visible" human rights violations occur. This fits with the idea of "intimate modification" of oneself imposed by the society, as explored in section 2, which the SOGI Guidelines seem to adopt to regulate the relation between IHRL and IRL.
However, due to the lack of a definition of persecution in the Refugees Convention, decision-makers have supported a more restrictive reading of IRL and, in turn, of the SOGI Guidelines. In fact, if we look at their current practice, decision-makers tend to focus on "visible" and specific abuses in human rights terms in order to recognise refugee 62 ibid. 63 status. Interestingly, in absence of these abuses, the decision may either consist of a denial of international protection or, as a proof of the inconsistency of their approach to IRL in light of IHRL, of alternative forms of protection (eg subsidiary protection or humanitarian protection). As the following sub-sections show, this approach seems indeed to be connected with the idea decision-makers have about the real role to be played by IHRL in the interpretation of IRL. In the European context, the EU's attempt in this respect is illustrative. EU law has tried to adopt such an approach by emphasizing the interaction between IRL and IHRL in the Article for the Special Issue on "Gendered Borders" to be published in Netherlands Quarterly of Human Rights, 3/2019 20 identification of a common, EU-wide, notion of persecution. In fact, going beyond the Refugees Convention, the EU Qualification Directive provides the first comprehensive definition of this term: 'to qualify as persecution, an act must be sufficiently serious by its nature or repetition as to constitute a severe violation of basic human rights', or 'be an accumulation of various measures provided that the effect is similar to the latter violation'. 66 As Storey has already observed, 67 this provision may be seen as the best available 'working definition' of persecution to implement the Refugees Convention in light of its text, aim and context, including IHRL. Even the non-exhaustive list of acts of persecution confirms this view. These are not based on specific rights, but stress the discriminatory effect produced on people's lives. To name a few, these can be physical or mental violence, legal, administrative, police, and/or judicial measures which are in themselves discriminatory or which are implemented in a discriminatory manner, and acts of a gender-specific nature (Art. 9.2 of the Qualification Directive).
Avoiding confusion: how IHRL contributes to the definition of persecution in

IRL
Nevertheless, when applied to claims based on sexual orientation, doubts have arisen in the identification of which acts are 'serious enough' to qualify as persecution. Probably supported by the reference to 'rights from which derogation cannot be made' included in the same provision for identifying an 'example' of basic human rights, decision-makers seem to have increasingly set an artificial border within the IHRL's catalogue to regulate its intersection with IRL. Some recent decisions, issued both at supranational and domestic level, may help to illustrate this point. This finding by the CJEU may be unsurprising if read in light of the ECtHR's case law on these basic rights. Although the ECHR does not enshrine a right to asylum, the ECtHR has been called to evaluate violations of the ECHR alleged by people fleeing homophobia who risked being sent back to their country of origin following the rejection of their asylum application. 70 Yet, since only treatment falling within the scope of Articles 2 or 3 68 As the CJEU put it in X and Others (n 16) [70], 'requiring members of a social group sharing the same sexual orientation to conceal that orientation is incompatible with the recognition of a characteristic so fundamental to a person's identity that the persons concerned cannot be required to renounce it'. 69 ibid [53]-[54]: 'not all violations of fundamental rights suffered by a homosexual asylum seeker will necessarily reach that level of seriousness'. 70 For a full list, see Nuno Ferreira, 'Tables of European SOGI Asylum Jurisprudence' (University of Sussex, 2019) <www.sogica.org> accessed 7 August 2019. To this day, most applications have been ECHR may raise an obligation to prevent asylum claimants being returned to their home country or to a third State, the ECtHR has been unable to protect people fleeing homophobia under the non-refoulement principle to this day. In fact, by relying on the national authorities' 'better position' to evaluate these cases, the ECtHR has never found that the risks to which applicants could have been exposed were "severe enough" to amount to inhuman or degrading treatment and/or torture (or life-threatening acts). The epitome of this approach was reached in M.E. v Sweden, 71 where the ECtHR went to far as to accept the possibility of sending a self-identified homosexual person back to his home country because 'he could restrict' his sexual orientation to the private dimension of his life. 72 It is no coincidence that in X and Others, following this ECtHR approach, the CJEU seemed to exclude such serious risks by limiting the human rights 'connected' to sexual orientation to certain non-derogable rights enshrined in the EU Charter. 73 Consequently, if a situation is not identified as falling within non-derogable human rights, ie when people fleeing homophobia have tried to enjoy 'other' human rights such as the right to respect for private and family life or the prohibition of discrimination in their countries, it may fall short of being considered in terms of persecution.
An example of this reasoning comes from an asylum case that was adjudicated at national level, namely before a first instance Tribunal in Italy, and was related to the refusal of refugee status to a Ukrainian national for feared persecution on account of her sexual orientation. 74 According to the applicant, she was forced to leave her country because the denigration and hostility against her and her partner by the Ukrainian society, and their surrounding community in particular, reached an unbearable point. 75 Although the applicant and her partner had cohabitated for two years before leaving Ukraine, the applicant publicly hid the real reason for moving into her partner's flat, thus pretending to be her housekeeper. Only on one occasion was this hostility reported to have led to acts of vandalism. Though the applicant's account was deemed credible, in the Tribunal's view she could not be said to have suffered persecution. In fact, although the Tribunal agreed that Ukrainian society has a general negative attitude towards sexual minorities because being homosexual is against 'Ukrainian moral principles' and 'absolutely unacceptable', 76 it cannot be said that Ukraine persecutes LGBT people. Therefore, the lives of the applicant and her partner had never been in danger (ie there was no 'visible' harm related to Articles 2 and 3 ECHR). Besides, cohabitation itself was deemed proof of absence of persecutory acts. Interestingly, since the violations of human rights suffered and feared by the applicant were deemed to be related 'only to' the denial of enjoyment of the 'fundamental' right to respect for family life in Ukraine, the Tribunal rejected refugee status based on lack of persecution. 77
In sum, to this day, the requirement of sufficiently "serious" or "severe" acts, respectively under the definition of persecution in EU law or the ill-treatment covered by the nonrefoulement obligation in IHRL, has not been qualified in a way that includes the European and national level, in the implementation of the Refugees Convention.
Therefore, while it is true that the CJEU found it irrelevant to distinguish acts that interfere with the core areas of the expression of sexual orientation from acts which do not affect those purported core areas, 78 both the CJEU and national decision-makers seems to require still "exogenous" harm to find persecution in sexual minorities' asylum claims.
This state of affairs may ultimately be connected to a misconception around the exact role of the IHRL in intersection with IRL. In the belief that IRL cannot impose obligations that the IHRL does not demand, 79 decision-makers may find it rational to limit human Others within the ECHR system in O.M. v Hungary (section 2), an approach that correctly resorts to IHRL to shape the notion of persecution under IRL without raising unnecessary distinctions between human rights is hereinafter illustrated.
Interpreting persecution in light of IHRL: possible ways forward
The previous section has shown that, at European level, the suffering experienced by people fleeing homophobia needs to be "visible" and particularly intense for identifying persecution. Although the above experiences of people fleeing homophobia demonstrate that the origin of the harm is not always 'visible' or connected to the violation of a specific human right/freedom, it is no coincidence that a higher burden has been placed on those claimants who had not been physically abused before leaving their home countries. 82 It is equally unsurprising that, during the SOGICA fieldwork, we found decision-makers who believe that the recognition of refugee status depends on the "intensity" of the harm suffered, thus identifying only the most serious and continuous violation of a non- 80 derogable human right as persecution. 83 Yet, a few promising decisions that question this approach can be found at the national level and are worth exploring here.
The first example comes from the Italian Supreme Court. 84 The case was related to a citizen of Senegal, a country that criminalises homosexuality. He claimed he was gay and unable to live freely in his country because of hostility in the familiar and social environment. 85 Following the administrative refusal of his asylum application, both the first and second instance Courts rejected his claim. Specifically, without paying attention to the criminalisation in force in Senegal, the Court of Appeal found that there was no persecution because no 'specific and tangible' acts of violence and threats were alleged.
Against this background, the Supreme Court found that 'persecution is to be considered a form of radical fight against a minority', 86 which can also be pursued by criminalising the behaviour that is intended to be fought. By recognising that gay people are forced to violate Senegal's criminal law and to expose themselves to severe penalties 'to live their sexuality freely', the Supreme Court eventually qualified persecution in terms of severe interference with 'private life' and serious repercussions on 'personal freedom'. 87 It is evident from this reasoning that persecution is far from being connected only to nonderogable rights. 88 Other national Courts seem to follow this approach by embracing a notion of persecution that focuses mostly on its effects on claimants rather than on specific human rights. 89 This is the case of the Cour National du Droit d'Asile (CNDA) in France. In a decision related to an asylum claimant from Venezuela, 90 which interestingly does not criminalise samesex sexual activity or homosexuality, the CNDA offered important insights on a possible definition of persecution that comprehensively embeds IHRL rather than looking at its scope of application. Firstly, it recalled that a person is neither asked to publicly manifest his/her sexual orientation in order to request refugee status, nor can he/she be required to avoid expressing this personal characteristic to escape persecution. 91 Secondly, it found that, although the law may formally protect against discrimination based on sexual orientation, same-sex couples' right to marriage/civil union may still not be recognised, and prejudice and exclusion may continue permeating society. 92 Consequently, considering the humiliating effects of these social and institutional attitudes on the specific situation of the applicant, the CNDA found that sexual minorities in Venezuela may in effect be at risk of persecution. Viewed from the perspective of IHRL, it is evident that the CNDA does not set any border between "permissible" and "non-permissible" human rights violations suffered by sexual minorities in their country of origin. It looks instead at the results of the social environment hostility against homosexuality in preventing gay people from enjoying their human rights (including, for instance, the right to employment 93 ).
For the sake of completeness, other alternatives have been raised to reach the same fruitful intersection between IHRL and IRL in relation to persecution of people fleeing homophobia. Firstly, a significant attempt to read IRL in light of IHRL can be found at normative level. As the previous paragraph has shown, the 'working definition' of persecution provided by the EU Qualification Directive was thought as a combination of IRL and IHRL obligations binding the EU. As a result, while defining persecution, it stresses the need to consider the effect of human rights violations on each asylum claimant 90 when it refers to persecution also as 'an accumulation of various measures'. Yet, it still provides that this effect should be "serious" enough to be compared to a "severe" violation of basic human rights. As the above analysis of CJEU's case law confirms, the extent to which such an effect is really assessed in relation to the individual experience of people fleeing homophobia remains highly doubtful. Its current implementation instead risks forcing people fleeing homophobia to fabricate a narrative of abuses in order to have their refugee status recognised, with negative consequences in terms of credibility once their real, 'more simple', story of deprivation of life's choices comes to surface. In brief, to reach its potential aim in terms of effective protection in cases involving people fleeing homophobia, this normative attempt needs further clarification at EU level, especially in the framework of the future reform of the CEAS. 94 A second alternative way to interpret persecution in such a way as to embed genuinely the protection afforded to sexual orientation by IHRL is based on a more open reading of non-derogable rights.
Taking the ECHR as an example, such an approach requires identifying the consequences of a denial and/or restriction of one's sexual orientation for attempting for enjoyment of the full catalogue of human rights and freedoms in terms of degrading/inhuman treatment or torture (Art. 3 ECHR). However, as the previous analysis has shown, it is difficult even for the ECtHR itself to qualify restrictions reserved to sexual minorities under Article 3, rather than Article 8. This cannot be surprising though. For example, since its outset, the ECtHR has failed to qualify criminalisation of same-sex conduct as a form of prohibited ill-treatment, because in its view this impinges only on the right to respect for private life. 95 Article for the Special Issue on "Gendered Borders" to be published in Netherlands Quarterly of Human Rights, 3/2019 29 society would require the ECtHR to confront the current restrictions to the equal enjoyment of human rights by sexual minorities still in force in many contracting States. 96 For these reasons, only an approach to the Refugees Convention that avoids borders between 'permissible' human rights violations and human rights violations leading to persecution, while stressing the effect of any human rights violation on the individual, can ensure that IHRL is appropriately considered in asylum claims. This will also ensure a more fruitful intersection between IRL and IHRL, being it in line with the VLTC.
Crossing borders to identify better solutions
IRL and IHRL are often viewed as complementary international legal regimes. For some, these are 'so intimately interdependent and imbricated that it is now virtually impossible to separate one from the other'. 97 This is especially true in light of the fact that IHRL has progressively become instrumental in reaching a 'dynamic understanding' of refugee law, in particular of the refugee notion, to reflect the evolution of today's international society.
Yet, as this contribution has argued by taking the example of people fleeing homophobia, there are still some inconsistenciesor even confusionin this ongoing relationship.
The cross-fertilisation between these two branches of international law is incomplete, as the European and national developments outlined here show. Perhaps more importantly, the role of IHRL should not be limited to the identification of people fleeing homophobia as a group of 'vulnerable' claimants and to the imposition of specific positive obligations, including procedural ones, on relevant States.
Firstly, IHRL may prove effective in raising duties of due diligence by adopting an impact-based model for evaluating the decisions of refusal of entry to receiving States in human rights terms. In fact, in absence of similar obligations under IRL, it may require 96 See Danisi, Tutela dei diritti umani (n 12) 298-300, in relation to the possibility to use Article 3 ECHR (in terms of degrading treatment), alone or in conjunction with non-discrimination (Art. 14 ECHR), against the restriction of public recognition for same-sex couples through marriage. 97 Chetail, Are Refugee Rights Human Rights? (n 46) 68.
Article for the Special Issue on "Gendered Borders" to be published in Netherlands Quarterly of Human Rights, 3/2019 30 relevant States to prevent life-threating experiences and torture or other prohibited illtreatment for the prevention of violations that SOGI asylum claimants may suffer in attempting to access asylum determination procedures. This reasoning certainly applies where there are "substantial grounds" for believing that this kind of treatment has taken or will take place, as seems to happen in the case of people fleeing homophobia (and beyondpotentially all 'vulnerable' groups under IHRL).
Secondly, IHRL may inform the understanding of the notion of persecution more comprehensively than it currently does in practice. Denials or restrictions in the enjoyment of human rights may indeed provide a parameter against which decisionmakers can verify how the perpetrator and the home country's society impose on sexual minorities an inner modification of the self. In doing so, developments in IHRL clarifies that the intersection with IRL cannot lead to creating borders between different human rights violations. Instead, considering the increasingly inclusive reading provided by human rights bodies so far as sexual orientation and its expression is concerned, IHRL can support decision-makers in understanding what life experiences really matter to people fleeing homophobia and, in turn, identifying those that generate a fear of persecution. This is currently far from the case. Despite the recommendations made by the UNHCR, European and national decision-makers still focus their attention on certain rights and freedoms, rather than assessing overall the effect of their denial or restrictions on the individual in creating the conditions for a well-founded fear of persecution.
By looking at the underlying "territorial" and "normative" borders that seem to prevent such developments, this paper has tried to contrast two debatable, but still widespread, assumptions. Firstly, there is an assumption that IHRL cannot fill the gaps of IRL in protecting refugees worldwide and vice versa. Secondly, despite the most recent evolution of the IHRL, a belief in the private nature of sexual orientation is still deeply rooted in decision-makers' thinking. If these territorial and normative borders were to be crossed, not only would people claiming asylum benefit, but there might also be unlooked Article for the Special Issue on "Gendered Borders" to be published in Netherlands Quarterly of Human Rights, 3/2019 31 for enhancements in the rights of sexual minorities who are residents of receiving countries. In fact, IRL may become instrumental in instilling in decision-makers a common understanding of the harm suffered by sexual minorities when they do not enjoy the wide catalogue of human rights because of their sexual orientation. In doing so, it would consequently contribute to the evolution of IHRL.
